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David P

David P. Mandell

Humanities 110

November 16, 2001

 

What’s Wrong with Democracy?

  1. Outline of Talk
  1. Introduction: The Problems of Democracy
  2. Liberty of Ancients vs. Liberty of Moderns
  3. Democracy and Deliberation
  4. Philosophy vs. Democracy

B. Passages
  1. The liberty of the Ancients consists in "exercising collectively, but directly … sovereignty; in deliberating, in the public square, over war and peace; in forming alliances with foreign governments; in voting laws, in pronouncing judgements; in examining the accounts, the acts, the stewardship of the magistrates; in calling them to appear in front of the assembled people, in accusing, condemning or absolving." (Constant, p. 311)

    2.  

  2. The liberty of the Moderns consists in "the right to be subjected only to the laws, and to be neither arrested, detained, put to death or maltreated in any way by the arbitrary will of one or more individuals. It is the right of everyone to express their opinion, choose a profession and practice it, to dispose of property, and even to abuse it; to come and go without permission, and without having to account for their motives or undertakings. It is everyone's right to associate with other individuals, either to discuss their interests, or to profess the religion which they and their associates prefer, or even simply to occupy their days or hours in a way which is most compatible with their inclinations or whims." (Constant, p. 310-11)
  3. Therefore, to insure that someone like that is ruled by something similar to what rules the best person, we say that he ought to be the slave of that best person who has a divine ruler within himself. It isn't to harm the slave that we say he must be ruled, which is what Thrasymachus thought to be true of all subjects, but because it is better for everyone to be ruled by divine reason, preferably within himself and his own, otherwise imposed from without, so that as far as possible all will be alike and friends, governed by the same thing. (Republic, 590d)
  4. Until philosophers rule as kings or those who are now called kings and leading men genuinely and adequately philosophize, that is, until political power and philosophy entirely coincide, while the many natures who at present pursue either one exclusively are forcibly prevented from doing so, cities will have no rest from evil. (Republic, 473d)
  5. Now, the members of this small group have tasted how sweet and blessed a possession philosophy is, and at the same time they've also seen the madness of the majority and realized in a word, that hardly anyone acts sanely in public affairs and that there is no ally with whom they might go to the aid of justice and survive, that instead they'd perish before they could profit either their city or their friends and be useless both to themselves and to others, just like a man who has fallen among wild animals and is neither willing to join them in doing injustice nor sufficiently strong to oppose the general savagery alone. Taking all this into account, they lead a quiet life and do their own work. Thus, like someone who takes refuge under a little wall from a storm or hail driven by the wind, the philosopher -- seeing others filled with lawlessness -- is satisfied if he can somehow lead his present life free from injustice and impious acts and depart from it with good hope, blameless and content. (Republic, 496c-d)
  6. Therefore good people won't be willing to rule for the sake of either money or honor. They don't want to be paid wages openly for ruling and get called hired hands, nor to take them in secret from their rule and be called thieves. And they won't rule for the sake of honor, because they aren't ambitious honor-lovers. So, if they're to be willing to rule, some compulsion or punishment must be brought to bear on them -- perhaps that's why it is thought shameful to seek to rule before one is compelled. Now, the greatest punishment, if one isn't willing to rule, is to be ruled by someone worse than oneself. And I think that it's fear of this that makes decent people rule when they do. They approach ruling not as something good or something to be enjoyed, but as something necessary, since it can't be entrusted to anyone better than -- or even as good as -- themselves. In a city of good men, if it came into being, the citizens would fight in order not to rule, just as they do now in order to rule. (Republic, 347c-d)
  1. Bibliography

Benjamin Constant, Political Writings (Cambridge, 1988)

S. Sara Monoson, Plato’s Democratic Entanglements (Princeton, 2000)

Josiah Ober, Mass and Elite in Democratic Athens (Princeton, 1989)

C. D. C. Reeve, Philosopher-Kings (Princeton, 1988)

Hum 110 | Reed Classics | Reed Library | Reed | Perseus