Steven Arkonovich - December 6, 2004

 

Egoism, Altruism and Friendship in Aristotle's Ethics

 

 

Outline of Lecture

 

I.                Introduction 

a.      "Friendship" vs. "Philia"

b.     Friendship and External Goods

c.      Egoism and Altruism

II.              A difficulty in Aristotle's Account of Friendship

a.      Definition of friendship in general

b.     Definition of particular kinds of friendship (pleasure friendship, utility friendship, and virtue friendship)

c.      A conflict between definitions

III.             Solving the difficulty

a.      "Causes" of Friendship: Basis vs. Goal

b.     Why "'perfect" friendships are better than imperfect friendships

c.      Altruism in Friendship

IV.            Conclusion: Egoism in Aristotle's Ethics

Passages from Books 8 & 9 of Aristotle's Ethics

1.          For without friends no one would choose to live though he had all other goods; even rich men and those in possession of office and of dominating power are thought to need friends most of all; for what is the use of such prosperity without the opportunity of beneficence, which is exercised chiefly and in its most laudable form towards friends? Or how can prosperity be guarded and preserved without friends? The greater it is, the more exposed is it to risk? [1155a5-11]

And in poverty and in other misfortunes men think friends are the only refuge. It helps the young, too, to keep from error; it aids older people by ministering to their needs and supplementing the activities that are failing from weakness; [1155a12-15].

Again, parent seems by nature to feel it for offspring and offspring for parent, not only among men but among birds and among most animals...Friendship seems too to hold states together, and lawgivers to care more for it than for justice [1155a19-24].

2.          ...of the love of lifeless objects we do not use the word 'friendship'; for it is not mutual love, nor is there a wishing of good to the other (for it would surely be ridiculous to wish wine well; if one wishes anything for it, it is that it may keep, so that one may have it oneself); [A] but to a friend we say we ought to wish what is good for his sake. But to those who thus wish good we ascribe only goodwill, if the wish is not reciprocated; goodwill when it is reciprocal being friendship.  [1155b29-35].

But perhaps we should add that friends are aware of the reciprocated goodwill. For many a one has goodwill to people whom he has not seen but supposes to be decent or useful, and one of these might have the same goodwill toward him. These people, then, apparently have goodwill to each other, but how could we call them friends, given that they are unaware of their attitude to each other? If they are to be friends, then, they must have goodwill to each other, wish each other goods and be aware of it, from one of the causes mentioned above [1155b35-36, Irwin translation]

3.          Hence friendship has three species, corresponding to the three objects of love. For each object of love has a corresponding type of mutual loving, combined with awareness of it [1155b37-1156a5, Irwin translation].

[B] But those who love each other wish goods to each other [only] insofar as they love each other. [C] Those who love each other for utility love the other not in his own right, but insofar as they gain some good for themselves from him. [D] The same is true of those who love for pleasure; for they like a witty person not because of his character, but because he is pleasant to them [1156a9-15, Irwin translation].

4.          The question is also debated, whether a man should love himself most, or some one else. People criticize those who love themselves most, and call them self-lovers, using this as an epithet of disgrace, and a bad man seems to do everything for his own sake, and the more so the more wicked he is-and so men reproach him, for instance, with doing nothing of his own accord-while the good man acts for honour's sake, and the moreso the better he is, and acts for his friend's sake, and sacrifices his own interest.  [1168a29-35].

 

5.          It is true of the good man too that he does many acts for the sake of his friends and his country, and if necessary dies for them; for he will throw away both wealth and honours and in general the goods that are objects of competition, gaining for himself nobility; since he would prefer a short period of intense pleasure to a long one of mild enjoyment, a twelvemonth of noble life to many years of humdrum existence, and one great and noble action to many trivial ones. Now those who die for others doubtless attain this result; it is therefore a great prize that they choose for themselves. They will throw away wealth too on condition that their friends will gain more; for while a man's friend gains wealth he himself achieves nobility; he is therefore assigning the greater good to himself. The same too is true of honour and office; all these things he will sacrifice to his friend; for this is noble and laudable for himself. Rightly then is he thought to be good, since he chooses nobility before all else. But he may even give up actions to his friend; it may be nobler to become the cause of his friend's acting than to act himself. In all the actions, therefore, that men are praised for, the good man is seen to assign to himself the greater share in what is noble. In this sense, then, as has been said, a man should be a lover of self; but in the sense in which most men are so, he ought not.

 

  [1169a19-1169b35].

Bibliography

Annas, Julia, "Plato and Aristotle on Friendship and Altruism." Mind  86 (1977).

Cooper, John. "Aristotle and the Forms of Friendship," in Reason and Emotion. Princeton: 1999.

 

Fortenbaugh, William, "Aristotle's Analysis of Friendship: Function and Analogy, Resemblance, and Focal Meaning." Phronesis 20 (1975).

Irwin, Terence., trans. Aristotle: Nicomachean Ethics. Hackett: 1985.

 

Price, A..W. Love and Friendship in Plato and Aristotle. Oxford: 1989.