Thucydides, the Sophists, and the Nature of Justice
Walter Englert
November 7, 2005
A. Outline of the Talk
- Introduction: Thucydides and the problem of justice
- Aspects of Thucydides’ history
- Human nature: strength, power, self-interest, and fear
- The gods and universal laws
- The use of speeches
- Thucydides, the Sophists, and the crisis of logos (speech, language, reasoning)
- Difficulty of Thucydides’ language
- Crisis of logos: the sophists and 5th century rhetoric
- Thucydides and Justice
- Justice in the speeches: Athens becomes a Sophist
- Corcyrean and Corinthian speeches at Athens (1.32-43)
- Corinthian and Athenian Speeches at Sparta (1.68-78)
- Mytilenian Debate (3.36-50)
- Melian Dialogue (5.84-116)
- Justice in the narrative: Does Thucydides have a view of justice?
- Conclusion: Thucydides and a possible solution to the problem of justice
B. Passages
- And it may well be that my history will seem less easy to read because of the absence in it of a romantic element. It will be enough for me, however, if these words of mine are judged useful by those who want to understand clearly the events which happened in the past and which (human nature being what it is) will, at some time or other and in much the same ways, be repeated in the future. My work is not a piece of writing designed to meet the taste of an immediate public, but was done to last forever. (Thucydides 1.22)
- As to the reasons why they broke the truce, I propose first to give an account of the causes of the complaint (aitiai) which they had against each other of the specific instances where their interests clashed: this is in order that there should be no doubt in anyone’s mind about what led to the great war falling upon the Hellenes. But the real reason (alêthestatê prophasis) for the war is, in my opinion, most likely to be disguised by such an argument. What made war inevitable was the growth of Athenian power and the fear which this caused in Sparta. As for the reasons for breaking the truce and declaring war which were openly expressed by each side, they are as follows. (Thucydides 1.23)
- A human being is the measure of all things—of things that are, that they are, and of things that are not, that they are not. (Protagoras, Curd 98:1)
- Concerning the gods I am unable to know either that they are or that they are not, or what their appearance is like. For many are the things that hinder knowledge: the obscurity of the matter and the shortness of human life. (Protagoras, Curd 98:2)
- There are two opposing arguments (logoi) concerning everything. (Protagoras, Curd 98:3)
- Three successive headings from Gorgias’ book On the Nonexistent or On Nature: “First and foremost, that nothing exists; second, that even if it exists it is inapprehensible to man; third, that even if it is apprehensible, still it is without a doubt incapable of being expressed or explained to the next man.” (Gorgias DK 82 B 3)
- [Thrasymachus] says that the just is nothing other than the interest of the stronger. (DK 85 B 6a)
- Justice consists in not transgressing the laws and usages of one’s state. Therefore the most profitable means of manipulating justice is to respect the laws when witnesses are present but otherwise to follow the precepts of nature. Laws are artificial compacts, they lack the inevitability of natural growth. Hence to break laws without detection does one no harm, whereas any attempt to violate the inborn dictates of nature is harmful irrespective of discovery by others, for the hurt is not merely, as with the lawbreaker, a matter of appearance or reputation, but of reality. (Antiphon of Athens, DK 87 B 90; cf. Curd 105:16)
- So it is with us. We have done nothing extraordinary, nothing contrary to human nature in accepting an empire when it was offered to us and then in refusing to give it up. Three very powerful motives prevent us from doing so—security, honor, and self-interest. And we were not the first to act in this way. Far from it. It has always been a rule that the weak should be subject to the strong; and besides, we consider that we are worthy of our power. Up till the present moment you, too, used to think we were; but now, after calculating your own interest, you are beginning to talk in terms of right and wrong. (Athenians speaking at Sparta: Thuc. 1. 76)
- Athenians: …Instead we recommend that you should try to get what is possible for you to get, taking into consideration what we both really do think; since you know as well as we do that, when these matters are discussed by practical people, the standard of justice depends on the equality of power to compel and that in fact the strong do what they have the power to do and the weak accept what they have to accept. (Thuc. 5.89)
- Athenians: …Our opinion of the gods and our knowledge of men lead us to conclude that it is a general and necessary law of nature to rule whatever one can. This is not a law that we made ourselves, nor were we the first to act upon it when it was made. We found it already in existence, and we shall leave it to exist forever among those who come after us. (Thucydides 5.105)
- What our question raises, then, is whether it is the object of this text to hold its actors responsible for what they say and do—to praise and blame, to admire and condemn—or whether, by contrast, its object is merely to describe and explain in some scientific fashion the chain of events that make up its narrative. The question affects the meaning of the text in the deepest way, yet it plainly has no answer. Such irresolution on matters of the greatest importance is a structural characteristic of the text as a whole. Again and again it suggests a question, or forces it upon the reader, and then offers grounds for conflicting responses. (White, 86)
- As the result of these revolutions, there was a general deterioration of character throughout the Greek world. The simple way of looking at things (to euêthes), which is so much the mark of a noble nature, was regarded as a ridiculous quality and soon ceased to exist. (Thucydides 3.83)
- Melians: Then in our view (since you force us to leave justice out of account and confine ourselves to self-interest) – in our view it is at any rate useful that you should not destroy a principle that is to the general good of all men – namely, that in the case of all who fall into danger there should be such a thing as fair play and just dealing, and that such people should be allowed to use and to profit by arguments that fall short of mathematical accuracy. And this is a principle which affects you as much as anybody, since your own fall would be visited by the most terrible vengeance and would be an example to the world. (Thucydides 5.90; cf. 3. 59; 3.84)
Bibliography:
Connor, W. Robert. Thucydides. Princeton, 1984.
Curd, Patricia. A Presocratics Reader: Selected Fragments and Testimonia. Indianapolis/Cambridge, 1996.
Garrity, Thomas. “Thucydides 1.22.1: Content and Form in the Speeches.” AJP 119 (1998) 361-384.
Heath, Malcolm. “Justice in Thucydides’ Athenian Speeches.” Historia 39 (1990) 385-400.
Kennedy, George. The Art of Persuasion in Greece. Princeton, 1963.
Kerferd, G.B. The Sophistic Movement. Cambridge, 1981.
Price, Jonathan. Thucydides and Internal War. Cambridge, 2001.
Reeve, David. “Thucydides on Human Nature.” Political Theory 27 (1999) 435-446.
White, James Boyd. When Words Lose Their Meaning. Chicago, 1984.