middle-class origin, their "fathers' generation," women, the Hizballah, the intelligentsia, the urban poor, and rural migrants—has remained alien to these authors.

Stylistically, *l'Utopie sacrifiée* is written as a long, analytical narrative, rather than as yet another chronology of events. The first half of the book is a thick description of this complex revolutionary imaginaire, revealing an eagerness among the young generation to break with the traditional order and to appropriate modernity to their own advantage. The second half covers the selection of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini as the paramount leader by this heterogeneous grassroots movement, the evolving role of the other charismatic clerical leaders, and the ultimate defeat of the revolutionary utopia, followed by despair, intolerance, and the sacralization of Khomeini.

Khosrokhavar's insistence on writing a sociology of social upheaval "from below" is the basis of some of the most thought-provoking discussions to have been published about, among other topics, the role of women, the lack of an organic intelligentsia, the "necrophilic" cult of martyrdom displayed by the revolutionary militia in the Iran-Iraq war, and the role of corruption as a systematic strategy of resistance by society against an intolerant and totalizing state.

Perhaps the most appropriate way to evaluate this contribution to the crowded body of literature about the Iranian Revolution is to classify it as a powerful manifesto for an alternative conceptualization of this historic event. Manifesto is an apt label for the book, because it should be seen within the context of the author's previous work, especially his fascinating fieldwork on urban housing, and the oral history/anthropology of the Revolution.[2] This also explains the curious lack of almost any empirical information in the book itself.

L'utopie sacrifiée is by no means a definitive statement. There are serious problems of style, theoretical premise, and even empirical assumption. The book is too long and often inexcusably repetitive, and its demographic theory of human agency, with the amorphous category of "the young generation" as the principal actor, simply lacks sufficient rigor. However, this book cannot be ignored, if simply because it is among a handful of studies on the subject that are actually based on field research, and not the textual exegesis of published documents and newspaper accounts! It is a tremendously thought-provoking work, and should be welcomed by all those tired of the repetitive and unimaginative string of material continuously printed about Iran. An edited translation, which eliminates the redundancies and supplements them with the author's highly original field research, would be highly recommended.

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2. See Farhad Khosrokhavar and Paul Vieille, *Le discours populaire de la révolution iranienne,* volume 1: Commentaire, volume 2: Entretiens, (Paris: Contemporanéite, 1990); Farhad Khosrokhavar and Bernard Hourcade, "L'habitat révolutionnaire à Téhéran, 1977–1981," *Herodote*, 31 (Fall 1983), pp. 61–83; and Farhad Khosrokhavar, "Nouvelle banlieue et marginalité: la Cité Taleghani à Khak-e Sefid," in *Téhéran; capitale bicentenaire*, ed. by Chahriar Adle and Bernard Hourcade (Paris and Tehran: Institut Français de Recherche en Iran, 1992), pp. 307–28. Most of the author's other work over the past decade has been published in the journal *Peuples mediterranéens.*

Torture and Modernity: Self, Society, and State in Modern Iran, by Darius M. Rejali. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1994. xviii + 176 pages. Appends. to p. 213. Notes to p. 253. Bibl. to p. 276. Index to p. 289. $46.95 cloth; $19.95 paper.

Reviewed by Margaret Lynd

In *Torture and Modernity*, Darius M. Rejali attempts to account for the processes he believes have led to the normalization of torture in the modern world. While focusing attention on historical and cultural details particular to Iran, Rejali situates his analysis within Michel Foucault's theoretical discussion of the political dimensions of modern disciplinary institutions and practices.[1] Rejali's book offers a thoughtful anal-

1. This discussion is outlined most clearly in Michel Foucault's *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison*, tr. by Alan Sheridan (New York: Vintage Books, 1979) and *The History of Sexuality: An Introduction*, tr. by Robert Hurley (New York: Vintage Books, 1980).

ysis of the Iranian situation, but also suggests more generally that modern states, regardless of their economic or political structure and even when they do not actively participate in torture, almost certainly have in place the disciplinary structures that allow them to slip easily into the aggressive use of torture to contain potentially subversive subjects.

The troubling question Rejali poses is whether modern torture is an aberration, an unfortunate consequence of singular configurations of circumstance and history, or whether, on the contrary, it is an integral element of the modern disciplinary state. Based on his analysis of Iran, Rejali convincingly concludes it to be the latter, at least when certain cultural features are also present. The insistence on the importance of cultural differences and propensities is central to Rejali's partial rejection of other theoretical positions, particularly Marxism and humanism, which, while useful, cannot fully account for the recurrence of torture. In fact, Rejali argues, torture in the modern state is a disciplinary mechanism parallel to, and fully consistent with, other institutionalized disciplinary systems—education, medicine, the military, law, labor, and penal. Like the disciplinary procedures of these seemingly more benign institutions, torture is contained, systematic, invasive—and very effective.

The function of torture in the late twentieth century, Rejali further contends, is rarely to extract information or confession, to exact retribution, or to underscore and deepen moral responsibility. Rather, in keeping with other disciplinary mechanisms, torture is intended to reform and normalize, to transform real, potential, or wholly imagined dissidents into docile and obedient subjects by invading the minds and bodies of its victims. The effects of modern torture—particularly its traumatizing psychological effects—produce subjects who not only pose little problem to authoritarian governments, but who also are likely to serve well an economic system that requires a tractable and unrebellious labor force.

While Rejali finds Foucault's articulation of discipline as a theoretical concept particularly useful to his own argument, he also faults Foucault for what he considers a general failing to take adequate account of cultural differences in his theoretical formulations. Moreover, he contends, far from explaining the persistence of modern torture, Foucault's writings, especially *Discipline and Punish*, suggest that as disciplinary procedures become entrenched, torture ceases to be a useful method of control. Rejali's answer to this apparent contradiction is to map out the various forms torture has taken in Iran over the past two centuries and compare them to the changes other mechanisms of order and control have similarly undergone. *Torture and Modernity* is persuasive in its call to study concrete historical/geographical/cultural situations, especially the specific disciplinary practices that characterize them, in order to understand more fully how modern (European) institutions have insinuated themselves and continue to function within a host of very diverse non-European societies.

The case of Iran is of particular interest precisely because, Rejali says, the Islamic Revolution, ostensibly a rejection of Western influence and a return to "tradition," has systematically and effectively incorporated Western practices of discipline in its enforcement of Islamic tradition. This is an ironic situation indeed, Rejali contends, since the nature of punishment in Iran since 1979 has far less to do with historical examples of Islamic traditions of either governance or justice than it has to do with the disciplinary apparatus of modern Western societies. Rejali's strongest argument for this position is his comparison of the function of torture during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries in Iranian society. Torture during the Qajar period of the nineteenth century, Rejali says, was primarily public and ritual; punishments were intended to be commensurate with, or at least in some way related to, the crime. By the beginning of the twentieth century, however, this public ritual character had begun to disappear. Modern torture was born, and along with it the modern medical, educational, military, and penal procedures and practices to which it is parallel. If those modern procedures were deployed with particular zeal during the reign of the Pahlavi shahs, the very pervasiveness of those procedures, Rejali contends, made torture all but inevitable by the Islamic revolutionaries who succeeded them.

It is this transition to modernity that Rejali documents through his discussion of the changing nature of torture in Iran (and through a photographic essay appended to the text). Rejali is not interested in psychoanalytic studies of torture that

locate motivation in the recesses of individual psyches and the dialectics of desire and power, insisting rather on the comparative study of actual practices of torture—the "how" rather than the "why"—in relation to specific cultural propensities and their transformation over time. Rejali's unprepossessing style and what he calls an old-fashioned concern for readability (Rejali's table of contents is a comprehensive, descriptive outline that includes not a single cryptic or clever turn of phrase) should not lead readers to underestimate his theoretical sophistication. Rather than offer detailed criticism of Foucault's (and others') limitations, Rejali enriches the Foucauldean perspective he adopts by illustrating the principle that cultural specificity is integral to cultural studies.

Rejali is further concerned to make his book accessible to a broad spectrum of readers: not only to cultural theorists and Middle East scholars, but also (and perhaps he is to be applauded for his "old-fashioned" stance in this regard) to an unspecialized, educated readership struggling to understand modernity, an audience with limited access to helpful scholarship in this world of free-floating information bytes and media spins on the one hand and highly abstract social theory on the other. This book probably will not receive much attention outside the world of Middle East scholarship, and that is a likelihood much to be regretted.

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LIBYA

The Making of Modern Libya: State Formation, Colonization, and Resistance, 1830–1932, by Ali Abdullatif Ahmida. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1994. xv + 144 pages. Appends. to p. 151. Notes to p. 188. Gloss. to p. 193. Refs. to p. 217. Index to p. 222. $49.50 cloth; $16.95 paper.

Reviewed by Ronald Bruce St John

In the introduction to this valuable study, Ali Abdullatif Ahmida rightly states that the study of modern North Africa in general, and Libya in particular, has been dominated by scholars mostly interested in French and Italian colonial studies, British social anthropology, and, to a lesser degree, what he terms the modernization school of the United States. One result of this generally Eurocentric focus is that the rich human history of resistance and struggle for survival in Libya has tended to be lost. This is especially true of the social and political history of Libya in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, a period of intense change initiated by the expansion into the countryside of colonial powers, first Ottoman and then European. In an effort to broaden the focus of modern Libyan studies, the author follows the lead of other contemporary scholars of North Africa, like Colette Establet, in reexamining Libyan colonial society and history from the viewpoint of the colonized.

Beginning with the year 1830, Ahmida explores the nature of the state and political economy of Tripolitania, Cyrenaica, and the Fezzan, with an emphasis on the impact of Ottoman state centralization, the decline of the Saharan trade, and the penetration of European financial capital. His examination of the political economy of Cyrenaica challenges the image of pre-Sanusi Cyrenaican tribal structure as primitive, feuding, and anarchic. On the contrary, he suggests, Cyrenaica possessed an elaborate, well-organized tribal structure. And it was this structure that facilitated the spread of the Sanusi order among the tribes of the region.

The ensuing discussion of the Libyan reaction to Italian colonialism is noteworthy, most especially the author's attempt to differentiate collaborators by social class and socioeconomic background. Drawing on sources of Libyan oral history, Ahmida suggests that many collaborators were chiefs and notables without firm religious or nationalist goals, who cooperated with the Italians largely to protect tribal or economic interests. At the same time, he rightly emphasizes that collaboration was often a very complex process with many different nuances in different parts of the country.

Islam and nationalism, for example, were interpreted differently according to the socioeconomic interests of the urban classes and tribes in various parts of the country. Such diverse backgrounds were integral to factionalism in Tripolitania,